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1 The situation and tasks of the
philosophy of art
Who needs a theory of art?
For almost all people in almost all cultures, either the fact (as in dance)
or the product (as in painting) of some commanding performance that
is both somehow signiﬁcant and yet absorbing in its own right (rather
than as an immediate instrument of knowledge or work) has raised strong
emotions. The dramatic rhapsode Ion, in Plato’s dialogue, reports that
when in performance he looks ‘‘down at [the audience] from the stage
above, I see them, every time, weeping, casting terrible glances, stricken
with amazement at the deeds recounted.”1 Richard Wagner ﬁnds nothing
less than salvation in the experience of art.
I believe in God, Mozart and Beethoven . . . I believe in the Holy Spirit
and the truth of the one, indivisible Art . . . I believe that through this
Art all men are saved, and therefore each may die of hunger for Her . . .
I believe . . . that true disciples of high Art will be transﬁgured in a
heavenly veil of sun-drenched fragrance and sweet sound, and united for
eternity with the divine fount of all Harmony. May mine be the sentence
of grace! Amen!2
Yet such commanding performances, their products, and their effects
in their audiences are puzzling. They often seem to come into being,
so Socrates claims, ‘‘not by skill [techne] but by lot divine.”3 Mysteriously,
poets and dancers and composers ‘‘are not in their senses” when they do
their work and ‘‘reason is no longer in [them].”4 Whatever considerable
thought is involved in making art, it seems to be not exactly the same kind
1 Plato, Ion, trans. Lane Cooper, in Plato, The Collected Dialogues, ed. Edith Hamilton
and Huntingdon Cairns (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1961), 535e, p. 221.
2 Richard Wagner, ‘‘Ein Ende in Paris,” Sämtliche Schriften 1:135, cited in Daniel K. L.
Chua, Absolute Music and the Construction of Meaning (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999).
3 ibid., 536d, p. 222. 4 ibid., 534a, 534b, p. 220.
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2 An Introduction to the Philosophy of Art
of thought that is involved in solving standard problems of trade, manu-
facture, or knowledge. Different audiences, moreover, respond to very dif-
ferent performances and works. The temple of Athena on the Acropolis,
John Coltrane’s Giant Steps, Jane Austen’s Pride and Prejudice, and J. M. W.
Turner’s Sunrise with a Boat between Headlands do not, on the face of it,
seem to have very much to do with one another. They were produced in
strikingly different media, for different audiences, in different cultural
circumstances. Do they or can they or should they all matter to larger au-
diences in the same or similar ways? What about such further efforts as
the body-performance art of Karen Finley or art student Matthew Hand’s
ﬂipping and catching of a beer coaster 129 times in a row, a ‘‘human in-
stallation” intended to explore ‘‘our perceptions of success and our desire
to be recognized as achievers”?5 What about woven baskets, video art, and
sports? Is art then a matter centrally of more or less local interests and
effects? Perhaps art is, as the English philosopher Stuart Hampshire once
remarked, ‘‘gratuitous,”6 in being connected with no central problems or
interests that attach to humanity as such. And yet, again, works of art --
products of human performance with powerfully absorbing effects -- are
there in all human cultures, and some of them have seemed to some of
their audiences to be as important in life as anything can be.
In response to these facts, it is natural -- for a variety of reasons -- to
wish for a theory of art, or at least for some kind of organizing account of
the nature and value of artistic performances and products. Aristotle, in
one of the earliest systematic accounts of the nature and value of works of
art in different media, seems to have been motivated by curiosity about his
own experience. His remarks on tragic drama in the Poetics are presented as
an account, developed by abstracting from his own experience of plays, of
how the trick of engaging and moving an audience is done and of its value.
He suggests that similar accounts can be developed for the other media of
art. In contrast, Plato in the Republic seems to be motivated centrally by a
combination of fear and envy of the seductive power of the arts, together
with a wish to displace the narrative art of Homer in the job of orienting
5 Matthew Hand’s work, ‘‘part of his ﬁnal studies in contemporary art” at Notting-
ham Trent University in the United Kingdom, is reported in David Cohen, ‘‘Pop Art,”
Chronicle of Higher Education 47, 41 (June 22, 2001), p. A8.
6 Stuart Hampshire, ‘‘Logic and Appreciation,” World Review (October 1952), reprinted
in Art and Philosophy, ed. W. E. Kennick, 2nd edn (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1979),
p. 652.
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The situation and tasks of the philosophy of art 3
fourth-century bce Greek culture. Barnett Newman’s famous quip that
‘‘Aesthetics is for the artist as ornithology is for the birds”7 suggests that
active artists have all too often found deﬁnitions of art in the Platonic style
to be irrelevant and obtuse at best and envious and hostile at worst. It is
true that some philosophers and theorists of art -- perhaps preeminently
Plato, in his pursuit of stability and order, both personal and cultural,
above all other values -- have been motivated by envy and fear of art’s
contingency, of the wayward creativity of artists, and of the powerful but
unruly emotions that works of art can induce. Yet it is equally difﬁcult for
work in the arts simply to go ‘‘its own way,” for what that way is or ought
to be is desperately unclear. Artists typically ﬁnd themselves sometimes
wanting to say something general about the meanings and values of their
works, so as to cast these works as of more than merely personal interest,
thence falling themselves into theory.
One might further hope that an account of the nature and value of art
would provide principles of criticism that we might use to identify, under-
stand, and evaluate art. If we could establish that all centrally successful
works of art necessarily possessed some valuable and signiﬁcant deﬁning
feature F, then, it seems, the task of criticism and the justiﬁcation of criti-
cal judgments would be clear. The critic would need only to determine the
presence or absence of F in a given work and its status and signiﬁcance
would be settled. In talking about such things as signiﬁcant form, artistic
expressiveness, having a critical perspective on culture, or originality, crit-
ics (and artists) seem often to draw on some such conception of a deﬁning
feature of art.
Yet a dilemma troubles this hope. Either the deﬁning feature that
is proposed seems abstract and ‘‘metaphysical” (signiﬁcant form; produc-
tive of the harmonious free play of the cognitive faculties; artistically
expressive), so that it could, with just a bit of background elucidation, be
discerned in nearly anything, or the deﬁning feature seems clear and spe-
ciﬁc enough (sonata form in music; triangular composition in painting;
the unities of time, place, and action in drama), but inﬂexible, parochial,
and insensitive to the genuine varieties of art. As a result, the prospects for
working criticism that is clearly guided by a settled deﬁnition of art do not
7 Barnett Newman, August 23, 1952. As a speaker at the Woodstock Art Confer-
ence in Woodstock, New York, according to Barnett Newman Chronology, archived
at www.philamuseum-newman.org/artist/chronology.shtml
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4 An Introduction to the Philosophy of Art
seem bright. At worst, for example in Heidegger’s talk of art as ‘‘the truth
of beings setting itself to work,”8 the proposed deﬁnition seems both meta-
physical and parochial, here part of Heidegger’s own efforts (like Plato’s
in a different direction) to urge on us quite speciﬁc forms of art and life
at the expense of others.
Hence theories of art seem likely not to be of immediate use in criti-
cism. They are sometimes motivated by fear, envy, and a wish for cultural
mastery. They can seem strikingly irrelevant, and even hostile, to the spe-
ciﬁc work of both artists and critics. Yet they also arise out of natural
curiosity about the nature of a powerful experience, and they seem un-
avoidable in attempting to say anything -- to oneself or to others -- about
the nature and value of that experience. What, then, are we really doing
when we are theorizing about art?
Philosophy as articulation
Instead of thinking of the philosophy of art as issuing in a settled theory --
the job of deﬁnition done once and for all -- we might think of various
conceptions of art as successful partial articulations of the nature, mean-
ing, and value of a certain kind of experience. These articulations, albeit
that each of them may be in one way or another one-sided, may help
us to become clearer about several things that we do in making and re-
sponding to art, and they may help us to connect these artistic doings
with other fundamental human interests: for example, cognitive inter-
ests, moral interests, and interests in self-display and performance. Iris
Murdoch, writing about goodness in general in many domains, offers a
useful characterization of how a metaphysical conception of the Good,
including the Good of Art, can be, as she puts it, ‘‘deep.”
Our emotions and desires are as good as their objects and are constantly
being modiﬁed in relation to their objects . . . There is no unattached will
as a prime source of value. There is only the working of the human spirit
in the morass of existence in which it always and at every moment ﬁnds
itself immersed. We live in an ‘‘intermediate” world . . .We experience the
distance which separates us from perfection and are led to place our idea
of it in a ﬁgurative sense outside the turmoil of existent being . . . The
8 Martin Heidegger, ‘‘The Origin of the Work of Art,” trans. Albert Hofstadter, in
Poetry, Language, Thought (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 36.
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The situation and tasks of the philosophy of art 5
Form of the Good . . .may be seen as enlightening particular scenes and
setting the specialized moral virtues and insights into their required
particular patterns. This is how the phenomena are saved and the
particulars redeemed, in this light . . . This is metaphysics, which sets up a
picture which it then offers as an appeal to us all to see if we cannot
ﬁnd just this in our deepest experience. The word ‘‘deep,” or some such
metaphor, will come in here as part of the essence of the appeal.9
As we live within the morass of existence -- surrounded by and caught up
in various artistic and critical practices; uncertain of the proper direction
for personal and cultural development; and in all this feeling ourselves
distinctively, yet variously, moved by different works that seem inchoately
to intimate a fuller value that they embody only in part -- we might hope
at least to become clearer and more articulate about our experiences and
commitments: more deep. We might hope to see the many phenomena
of art ‘‘in a certain light.” Carried out in this hope, the philosophy of
art will itself then be a kind of neighbor to the activity of art itself, in
that it will seek (without clear end) -- albeit more via abstract thought,
explicit comparison, and discursive reasoning -- both clarity about and fur-
ther realization of our natural interest in what is good within the morass
of existence.
Art as a natural social practice
In beginning to try to be articulate about what in various works of art
distinctly moves us, it is important to remember that making and respond-
ing to works of art, in many media, are social practices. It is inconceivable
that these practices are the invention of any distinct individual. Any
intention on the part of an individual to make art would be empty, were
there no already going practices of artistic production and response. If
there are no shared criteria for artistic success, then the word art cannot
be used objectively, as a descriptive term. If I have only myself to go on,
then ‘‘whatever is going to seem right to me [to call art] is right. And that
only means that here we can’t talk about ‘right.’”10
9 Iris Murdoch, Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991),
p. 507.
10 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 3rd edn, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe
(New York: Macmillan, 1958), §258, p. 92e; interjection added.
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6 An Introduction to the Philosophy of Art
In fact works of art -- objects and performances singled out for special
attention to their signiﬁcances fused with their forms -- are present in all
cultures (and not clearly among other animals). Children typically delight
in the activities of play, gesture, and imitation out of which art making
emerges. Learning to recognize and make representations -- to pretend,
to imagine, to draw -- goes together with learning to talk. Succeeding
in representation, in forming and articulating one’s experience, involves
a sense of accomplishment and liberation, overcoming frustration and
difﬁculty.
Without offering any scientiﬁc account of the material basis of their
emergence, Nietzsche usefully speculates in The Birth of Tragedy on the
motives and experiences that may have ﬁgured in some of the historically
earliest distinctively artistic makings. Artistic making, Nietzsche proposes,
stems from the interfusion of two tendencies. The Apollinian tendency
is the tendency to delight in representations, appearances, preeminently
dreams at ﬁrst, as appearances, including ‘‘the sensation that [the dream]
is mere appearance,”11 something I entertain that, however intense, does
not immediately threaten or touch me. I can delight in contemplat-
ing these appearances as mine. The Dionysian tendency is the tendency,
afﬁliated with intoxication, to abandon one’s individuality so as both to
reafﬁrm ‘‘the union between man and man” and to ‘‘celebrate . . . reconcil-
iation” with otherwise ‘‘alienated, hostile, or subjugated” nature.12 These
tendencies emerge at ﬁrst ‘‘as artistic energies which burst forth from
nature herself, without the mediation of the human artist,”13 as people ﬁnd
themselves both dreaming, talking, and representing, on the one hand,
and engaging in rituals (as forms of ‘‘intoxicated reality”14), on the other.
When these two tendencies are somehow merged -- when the Dionysian
orgies are taken over by the Greeks, who in them are aware of themselves
as performing and representing (and not simply and utterly abandoning
individuality), then art exists and ‘‘the destruction of the principium individ-
uationis for the ﬁrst time becomes an artistic phenomenon.”15 Individually
and collectively, human beings come to represent their world and experi-
ences not simply for the sake of private fantasy, not simply for the sake
of instrumental communication about immediate threats and problems,
11 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and the Case of Wagner, trans. Walter Kauf-
mann (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 34.
12 ibid., p. 37. 13 ibid., p. 38. 14 ibid. 15 ibid., p. 40.
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The situation and tasks of the philosophy of art 7
but as an expression of a common selfhood, ‘‘as the complement and con-
summation of [the] existence”16 of human subjectivity, ‘‘seducing one to
a continuation of life”17 as a subject.
Whatever their accuracy in detail, Nietzsche’s speculations are surely
apt in proposing the emergence of artistic making and responding as
cultural rather than distinctly individual, as more or less coeval with the
emergence of distinctively human culture and self-conscious subjectivity
as such, as driven by deep, transpersonal needs and tendencies, and as
serving a signiﬁcant interest of subjectivity in its own articulate life. Their
aptness is conﬁrmed both in the presence of art in all cultures and in the
ontogenetic development of children into full self-conscious subjectivity
in and through play, imitation, representation, expression, and art.
Action, gesture, and expressive freedom
Both personal development and cultural development are freighted with
frustration and difﬁculty. The German poet Friedrich Ho¨lderlin suggested
in an early essay, in a line of thought both latent in Judaeo-Christian
primeval history and later developed by Freud among others, that we
become distinctly aware of ourselves as subjects only through transgres-
sion. Our ﬁrst awareness of our responsibility as subjects for what we
do, Ho¨lderlin proposes, appears through the experience of punishment:
through coming actively to understand that one has done one thing when
one could and ought to have done something else. ‘‘The origin of all our
virtue occurs in evil.”18 Likewise, it is scarcely possible that we would be
aware of ourselves as having and participating in culture, as opposed to
mere persistent and automatic routine, were there no experiences of an-
tagonism and negotiation over what is to be done: over how to cook or
hunt or build, or how to sing, decorate the body, or form kinship rela-
tions. Any distinctly human cultural life has alternatives, antagonisms,
and taboos everywhere woven through it.
Suppose, then, that one ﬁnds oneself caught up in a difﬁcult and ob-
scure course of personal and cultural development. One might well seek
16 ibid., p. 43. 17 ibid.
18 Friedrich Ho¨lderlin, ‘‘On the Law of Freedom,” in Essays and Letters on Theory, ed.
and trans. Thomas Pfau (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press), pp. 33--34 at
p. 34.
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8 An Introduction to the Philosophy of Art
full investment in a worthwhile activity of performance or making. One
might seek to have the performance or product that results from this
activity be one’s own -- concretely infused with one’s particular sense of
embodiment, attitude, interest, sensibility, and personal history -- and yet
also be meaningful to others, rather than emptily idiosyncratic. In this
way, one might hope to have achieved through this activity, and in its
performance or product, a widely ratiﬁable exempliﬁcation of the pos-
sibilities of human subjectivity and action as such, thereby establishing
for oneself a more secure place as a subject amidst transgressions and
antagonisms.
In different but closely related ways, both John Dewey and Theodor
Adorno pose this -- the achievement of the most concrete and fullest pos-
sibilities of human communicative action as such -- as the task of art. For
Dewey, ‘‘Art is the living and concrete proof that man is capable of restor-
ing consciously, and thus on the plane of meaning, the union of sense,
need, impulse, and action characteristic of the live creature.”19 For Adorno,
art is ‘‘the image of what is beyond exchange”;20 that is, the genuine work
of art, unlike the fungible manufactured commodity, is speciﬁcally and
concretely meaningful, as the result (whether as performance or product)
of the activity of discovering, through the formative exploration of ma-
terials, what can be done with paint, sound, stone, the body, words, or
light.
This idea of the concrete and speciﬁcally meaningful product or per-
formance, formed through explorative activity, makes it clear that the
antithesis that is sometimes posed -- is art a (physical) product or thing,
or is it an (experienced) idea or meaning? -- is a false one. Dewey usefully
observes that ‘‘the actual work of art is what the product [whether perfor-
mance or physical object] does with and in experience.”21 That is, there
must be a product, whether performance or physical object or document
or text, but in order to function as art this product must matter speciﬁ-
cally and concretely within human experience. Even found art, supposing
it to be successful, is experienced as the result of the selecting activity of
governing intentionality, put before us in order to be experienced. Dewey
19 John Dewey, Art as Experience (New York: Penguin Putnam, 1934), p. 25.
20 Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, ed. and trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor (Minneapo-
lis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 83.
21 Dewey, Art as Experience, p. 3.
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The situation and tasks of the philosophy of art 9
distinguishes between the art product (the vehicle of the artistic experi-
ence) and the work of art (the vehicle as it is actually experienced), and
he argues that product and work are essentially interrelated.22 Perhaps
the importance of the product-of-activity-as-experienced is what Heideg-
ger had in mind in speaking of ‘‘the work-being of the work”23 and of
how ‘‘the happening of truth is at work”24 in it.
Dewey goes on to note that the media in which art activity can success-
fully occur -- in which concretely and speciﬁcally communicative artistic
products can be achieved -- are not ﬁxed. ‘‘If art is the quality of an activity,
we cannot divide and subdivide it. We can only follow the differentiation
of the activity into different modes as it impinges on different materials
and employs different media.”25 Some materials and media, and some art
products or vehicles (whether performances or texts or physical things)
achieved through formative activity exercised in relation to materials and
media, are necessary in order for there to be art. But there is no way of
ﬁxing in advance of explorative activity which materials and media can
be successfully explored in which ways. There is, rather, what Dewey calls
‘‘a continuum, a spectrum”26 of an inexhaustible variety of available me-
dia running roughly from the ‘‘automatic” or performance-related arts,
using ‘‘the mind-body of the artist as their medium,” to the ‘‘shaping”
arts, issuing in a distinctly formed physical product.27 Along this rough
and variable spectrum, which successes are available in which media -- in
basket making or whistling, in painting, in song, or in the movies -- is not
predictable in advance of explorative activity and aptly attentive experi-
ence. To suppose otherwise is to attempt -- as Plato attempted -- vainly to
erect a regnant classicism to constrain the efforts of human subjects to
achieve concretely and speciﬁcally meaningful actions and vehicles (per-
formances or products) in an exemplary way.
It is useful here to compare works of art with gestures (which may
themselves be both components of ﬁne art and independent vehicles of so-
cial art). Gestures (such as attentively following a conversation, or making
an unexpected gift, or brushing a crumb from someone’s shoulder) stem
from intelligence addressing a problem in context. They are ‘‘saturated”
with intentionality, which has both an individual aspect and a cultural
background always present as part of its content. They essentially involve
22 ibid., p. 162. 23 Heidegger, ‘‘Origin of the Work of Art,” p. 55.
24 ibid., p. 60. 25 Dewey, Art as Experience, p. 214. 26 ibid., p. 227. 27 ibid.
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10 An Introduction to the Philosophy of Art
bodily activity or doing one among a great variety of possible things in a
speciﬁc way. They involve the balancing or adjustment of social relations.
They carry a message or signiﬁcance, but often one that it is difﬁcult
wholly to ‘‘decode” or paraphrase, involving as it does speciﬁc bodily pos-
ture and ongoing nuances of relationship. They exist, in different forms,
in all cultures.
Works of art may, however, be unlike gestures in the range and depth
of the claims that they exert upon our attention. Anyone unable to follow
and to produce a certain range of gestures appropriate to occasions within
a speciﬁc culture would be a kind of social idiot. Yet we do not have prac-
tices of formal training in social gestures, as we instead leave such matters
to elders, normal family life, and the occasional etiquette book. There is
no curriculum in gestures anything like the one that runs in the arts from
the music lessons and art classes of young childhood into conservatories
and schools of art. Some ability to participate in or to follow intelligently
the activities of making and understanding art, including forms of this
activity outside one’s immediate cultural context, and some interest in
doing so are typically thought to be a mark of an educated person. One
who lacked this ability and interest altogether would be thought to be a
philistine or in some way not deep. The study and practice of painting
or music or literature is thought to be a ﬁt central occupation for some
lives, whereas the study and practice of manners is a simple requirement
of ordinary sociality. To be sure, these differences may not be sharp every-
where. A certain cosmopolitanism in manners may require certain forms
of study, and there may be highly ritualized patterns of social gesture,
such as Japanese tea ceremonies, which themselves verge on ﬁne art. Yet
broadly speaking these differences in range and depth of claim on us seem
to be widely accepted. For all their importance, manners seem -- it seems
natural to say -- in their speciﬁc patterns to be signiﬁcantly relative to
speciﬁc cultures.
In contrast, works of art, though they vary widely in speciﬁc form both
across and within cultures, seem somehow more ‘‘objective” in the claims
they make on us. If this is indeed so, then it must be because, as Richard
Wollheim elegantly puts it, the making and understanding of art some-
how involve ‘‘the realization of deep, indeed the very deepest, properties
of human nature.”28 It is, however, desperately difﬁcult to say, clearly and
28 Richard Wollheim, Art and its Objects, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1980), p. 234.
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The situation and tasks of the philosophy of art 11
convincingly, both what these deep properties or interests of human na-
ture that are realized in art might be and how, speciﬁcally, different works
achieve this realization. The variety of works of art must be faced. Perhaps
there is no single central function or functions that different works of art
variously fulﬁll, so that they are in the end thoroughly like gestures and
manners in being relative to culture and individual taste. Further, many
of the works that it seems reasonable to regard as art are not particularly
successful: they are preparatory studies, or failed attempts, or children’s
ﬁrst efforts to take up a region of practice. Not everything that it is rea-
sonable to call art will clearly and distinctly fulﬁll a central function. Any
function that works of art might be taken centrally to aim at fulﬁlling
(with some of them actually fulﬁlling it in an exemplary way) must both
accommodate present varieties of art and leave room for further innova-
tive explorations of new media.
Despite these real difﬁculties, however, many works of art -- and not
always either from one’s own culture or to one’s individual immediate
liking -- seem to make a claim on us. We think it worthwhile to teach them
formally, to train people formally in the activities of making and under-
standing such works, and to encourage further explorations of possibili-
ties of artistic success. Those who achieve artistic success can sometimes
strike us, as Stanley Cavell puts it in describing an ambition of philosoph-
ical writing, as having achieved ‘‘freedom of consciousness, the beginning
of freedom . . . freedom of language, having the run of it, as if successfully
claimed from it, as of a birthright.”29 It has already been suggested that
such an achievement involves a widely ratiﬁable exempliﬁcation of the
possibilities of human subjectivity and action as such, or the restoration
of ‘‘the union of sense, need, impulse, and action characteristic of the
live creature” (Dewey), or an embodiment of ‘‘the image of what is be-
yond exchange” (Adorno). A common theme in these summary formulas
is that artistic activity aims at the achievement of expressive freedom:30 orig-
inality blended with sense; unburdening and clariﬁcation blended with
representation.
Whatever their interest, such summary formulas nonetheless raise
considerable problems. Exactly what is meant by expressive freedom or
29 Stanley Cavell, This New yet Unapproachable America: Lectures after Emerson after Wittgen-
stein (Albuquerque, NM: Living Batch Press, 1989), p. 55.
30 For a partial elucidation of the notion of expressive freedom, see Richard Eldridge,
Leading a Human Life: Wittgenstein, Intentionality, and Romanticism (Chicago, IL: University
of Chicago Press, 1997), passim but especially pp. 6--7 and 32--33.
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12 An Introduction to the Philosophy of Art
original sense31 or what is beyond exchange or unburdening or the union of sense,
need, impulse, and action? How are such ends achievable through different
kinds of artistic formative activity? Why does the achievement of such
ends matter? Is their achievement genuinely a deep human interest? Can
such achievements be accomplished in ways that admit of and even com-
mand wide, perhaps universal, endorsement among attentive audiences?
Or are they always to some degree partial and parochial?
These questions and related ones have been central to the most fruitful
work in the philosophy of art. In treating them, the philosophy of art must
draw all at once on the philosophy of mind, social theory, metaphysics,
ethics, and the history and criticism of particular arts. Accounts of speciﬁc
artistic achievements in speciﬁc styles must be interwoven with accounts
of cultural developments, in order to show how speciﬁc achievements
may advance deep and general human interests. Nor does work in the
philosophy of art leave work in the philosophy of mind, social theory,
metaphysics, ethics, and criticism unaltered. Given that engagements with
some speciﬁc forms of art is a normal and signiﬁcant human activity,
theories of mind should take account of the powers and interests that
are embodied in these engagements, just as the philosophy of art must
take account of how human powers and interests are engaged in other
domains.
Schiller on art, life, and modernity
Friedrich Schiller’s philosophy of art offers a particularly clear illustration
of the difﬁculties involved in addressing the problems of human powers
and interests in art and in other regions of life. Schiller notoriously contra-
dicts himself in Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man. He argues ﬁrst that
engagement with artistic achievements is instrumental to the further ends
of political freedom and individual moral autonomy. ‘‘If we are to solve
[the] political problem [of freedom] in practice, [then] follow the path of
aesthetics, since it is through Beauty that we arrive at freedom.”32 ‘‘There
31 On original sense as Kant and Wordsworth theorized about it, see Timothy Gould,
‘‘The Audience of Originality: Kant and Wordsworth on the Reception of Genius,”
in Essays in Kant’s Aesthetics, ed. Ted Cohen and Paul Guyer (Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 179--93.
32 Friedrich Schiller, On the Aesthetic Education of Man, in a Series of Letters, trans. Regi-
nald Snell (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1954), second letter, p. 27.
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is no other way to make the sensuous man rational than by ﬁrst making
him aesthetic.”33 But Schiller also argues, second, that artistic activity is
an end itself, in both incorporating and transcending mere morality and
politics.
Beauty alone can confer on [Man] a social character. Taste alone brings
harmony into society, because it establishes harmony in the individual.
All other forms of perception divide a man, because they are exclusively
based either on the sensuous or on the intellectual part of his being;
only the perception of the Beautiful makes something whole of him,
because both his [sensuous and rational--moral] natures must accord
with it . . . Beauty alone makes all the world happy, and every being
forgets its limitations as long as it experiences her enchantment.34
This contradiction is not a simple mistake on Schiller’s part. Instead
it displays the difﬁculty of establishing the usefulness and signiﬁcance of
art, in the relation of artistic activity to central, shared human problems,
on the one hand, and of respecting the autonomy of art, including its
ability to deepen and transform our conceptions of our problems and
interests, on the other.
Schiller’s sense of art’s divided roles -- as instrument for social--moral
good and as end in itself -- further embodies his wider sense of the nature
of human culture, particularly of human culture in modernity. There is
no human culture without some distinct social roles and some division
of labor. Peoples in different places develop different customs and sets
of social roles. Social roles and the division of labor develop as cognitive
and technological mastery of nature increase, in ways that do not happen
in other species. Human life becomes increasingly dominated by what is
done within one or another cultural role, rather than by naked necessities
of immediate survival. As this development takes place, those occupying
distinct social roles can become more opaque to one another. Manufactur-
ers and those predominantly bound up in immediate social reproduction
(historically, typically women) can misunderstand and scorn one another,
as can manual workers and intellectuals, farmers and warriors, traders
and politicians. At the same time, however, as social roles increase in
number, complexity, and opacity to one another, social boundaries also
become to some extent more permeable. As the requirements for playing a
33 ibid., twenty-third letter, p. 108. 34 ibid., twenty-seventh letter, pp. 138--39.
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distinct social role come to depend more on knowledge and less on imme-
diate biological or familial inheritance, people come to be able to take up
new social roles somewhat more freely, though severe constraints stem-
ming from inequalities in background social, economic, and cognitive
capital remain in place.
The result of all these developments, in Schiller’s perception, is a com-
bination of development toward civilization and what he calls antagonism:
a mixture of mutual opacity, envy, vanity, and contestation that pervades
the playing of developed social roles. Development and antagonism set for
us a problem to be solved, the problem of the free and ﬁt, reharmonized
development of culture, so as to lift ourselves out of mere one-sidedness
and vanity.
There was no other way of developing the manifold capacities of Man
than by placing them in opposition to each other. This antagonism of
powers is the great instrument of culture, but it is only the instrument;
for as long as it persists, we are only on the way towards culture.
. . . Partiality in the exercise of powers, it is true, inevitably leads the
individual into error, but the race to truth. Only by concentrating the
whole energy of our spirit in one single focus, and drawing together our
whole being into one single power, do we attach wings, so to say, to this
individual power and lead it artiﬁcially beyond the bounds which Nature
seems to have imposed upon it.35
Schiller imagines, almost certainly erroneously, that once upon a time
Greek life formed a beautiful whole in which religion, art, ethical life, poli-
tics, and economic life were all one. ‘‘At that time, in that lovely awakening
of the intellectual powers, the senses and the mind had still no strictly
separate individualities, for no dissension had yet constrained them to
make hostile partition with each other and determine their boundaries.”36
35 ibid., sixth letter, pp. 43, 44. Schiller’s remarks on antagonism as both the instru-
ment of civilization and as a problem to be overcome are a transcription of Kant’s
remarks on antagonism in his essay ‘‘Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopoli-
tan Point of View,” in Immanuel Kant, On History, ed. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis,
IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), pp. 11--26, especially pp. 15--16. Compare also Schiller’s ‘‘On
Na¨ıve and Sentimental Poetry,” trans. Daniel O. Dahlstrom, in Friedrich Schiller,
Essays, ed. Walter Hinderer and Daniel O. Dahlstrom (New York: Continuum, 1993),
pp. 179--260, especially pp. 249--50.
36 ibid., sixth letter, p. 38.
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Abstract thought and sensation, art and religion, politics and farming
were all, Schiller imagines, in harmony with one another. In work, in
civic life, in religion, in science, and in art the Greeks could, Schiller
supposes, exchange roles and understand one another.
Schiller’s fantasy seems very likely to underestimate genuine divisions
and antagonisms that were present in Greek life. Yet as a fantasy it has
two further functions. First, it offers a diagnosis of our current situation,
problems, and prospects. Selfhood within culture, in involving taking up
one among a number of opposed, available social roles, is experienced
as a problem. One comes to be unsure of the meaning or signiﬁcance of
what one does and who one is. One’s actions feel motivated by coercion --
either immediate or stemming from the necessity of instrumentally sat-
isfying desires in oneself that are mysterious -- rather than by expressive
intelligence. Or, as Schiller describes modern life,
That zoophyte character of the Greek states, where every individual
enjoyed an independent life and, when need arose, could become a
whole in himself, now gave place to an ingenious piece of machinery, in
which out of the botching together of a vast number of lifeless parts a
collective mechanical life results. State and Church, law and customs,
were now torn asunder; enjoyment was separated from labour, means
from ends, effort from reward. Eternally chained to only one single little
fragment of the whole Man himself grew to be only a fragment; with
the monotonous noise of the wheel he drives everlastingly in his ears, he
never develops the harmony of his being, and instead of imprinting
humanity upon his nature he becomes merely the imprint of his
occupation, of his science.37
However it may have been with the Greeks, this diagnosis of the experience
of selfhood and action in modern culture as an experience of fragmentari-
ness, lack of harmony, and lack of evident signiﬁcance is likely to resonate
with many. Given the nature of modern divided labor, it is very difﬁcult
to see how this experience might be transformed.
Second, Schiller’s fantasy of Greek life leads him to identify art --
particularly art as manifested in Greek sculpture and epic, now to be
taken up by us as a model, in relation to modern needs -- as the proper
37 ibid., p. 40.
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instrument of the transformation of experience and the achievement of
meaningfulness.
We must be at liberty to restore by means of a higher Art this wholeness
in our nature which Art has destroyed . . . Humanity has lost its dignity,
but Art has rescued and preserved it in signiﬁcant stone; Truth lives on
in the midst of deception, and from the copy the original will once
again be restored.38
This too may be a fantasy. Schiller is himself all too aware of the depth of
the
rather remarkable antagonism between people in a century in the
process of civilizing itself. Because this antagonism is radical and is
based on the internal form of the mind, it establishes a breach among
people much worse than the occasional conﬂict of interests could ever
produce. It is an antagonism that robs the artist and poet of any hope of
pleasing and touching people generally, which remains, after all, his
task.39
If there is deep and standing rather than occasional conﬂict of interest,
arising out of divided social roles, and if the artist has no hope of pleasing
universally, then perhaps art cannot do its job, and perhaps fully signiﬁ-
cant action and selfhood are not quite possible.
Schiller’s fantasy about art nonetheless continues to be felt by many
people in modern culture, though almost surely not by everyone. Though
earlier cultures were perhaps more uniﬁed in certain respects than mod-
ern western culture, this fantasy may nonetheless have been distinctly felt
by those who in those cultures devoted themselves to painting, drama,
lyric, epic, or dance. They were surely aware of themselves as doing some-
thing quite different from what many or most people did in the courses of
economic and social life. The idea or hope or fantasy that in and through
artistic activity one might achieve fully signiﬁcant action and selfhood --
achieve a kind of restoration and wholeness of sensation, meaning, and
activity in the face of present dividing antagonisms -- has deep sociopsy-
chological roots, ancient and modern, and it does not easily go away. Yet
the social differences that provoke this idea and make it seem necessary
38 ibid., sixth letter, p. 45; ninth letter, p. 52.
39 Schiller, ‘‘On Na¨ıve and Sentimental Poetry,” p. 249.
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do not go away either. The hoped-for redemption never quite comes com-
pletely, and some remain untouched by or even hostile to each particular
form of artistic activity.
Identification versus elucidation
In this situation the task of the philosophy of art involves balancing the
identification of distinct works of art against the critical elucidation of the
function and signiﬁcance of art, as they are displayed in particular cases.
Theories of art that focus preeminently on the task of identification include
Hume’s theory of expert taste, institutional theories of art such as that
of George Dickie, and so-called historical theories of art such as that of
Jerrold Levinson. Theories of this kind tend at bottom to have more em-
piricist and materialist epistemological and metaphysical commitments.
The central task of theory is taken to be that of picking out from among
the physical things in the universe the wide variety of things that count
as art. Hume appeals to the judgment of expert critics to do this job;40
Dickie invokes the institutions of art and the idea of presentation to an
art world;41 Levinson appeals to presentation of an object at time t under
the intention that it be regarded ‘‘in any way (or ways) artworks existing
prior to t are or were correctly (or standardly) regarded.”42
These different but related deﬁnitions of art have considerable merits.
They address the question of identiﬁcation directly and sharply. They spec-
ify that things are works of art not, as it were, ‘‘in themselves,” but rather
only in relation to human sensibility and to historical human practices
and institutions. They accommodate well the enormous variety of things
that are commonly counted as art. Yet they also have an air of both circu-
larity and disappointment. How can expert judges, relevant institutions,
and appropriate manners of regard be speciﬁed without first specifying
the nature of the works to which attention is to be directed? As Monroe
Beardsley usefully objects to Levinson, if ‘‘correctly (or standardly)” in
40 See David Hume, ‘‘Of the Standard of Taste,” in The Philosophy of Art: Readings Ancient
and Modern, ed. Alex Neill and Aaron Ridley (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1995), pp. 255--68.
Hume’s theory of taste will be discussed at length in chapter 7 below.
41 See George Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1974)
and his The Art Circle (New York: Haven Publications, 1984).
42 Jerrold Levinson, ‘‘Deﬁning Art Historically,” British Journal of Aesthetics 19 (1979);
reprinted in Philosophy of Art, ed. Neill and Ridley, pp. 223--39 at p. 230.
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Levinson’s deﬁnition is to mean more than merely ‘‘habitually” (since there
may be bad habits of regard), then something more will have to be said
about the values and functions that correct regard discerns.43 If we can-
not say how and why we are supposed to regard works in order correctly
to discern their value, then reference to regarding-as-art will seem both
circular and empty. Theories that highlight the variety of objects that
are historically identiﬁed as art, without offering general accounts of the
value and meaning of art, run risks of triviality and emptiness. Similar ob-
jections can be made against both Hume’s and Dickie’s theories of artistic
identiﬁcation.
Levinson is, however, well aware of these problems. For him, any
critical elucidation of the functions and values of art will be both dogmat-
ically inﬂexible, in the face of the legitimate varieties of art, and insen-
sitive to the details of the historical evolution of artistic practices. Hence
Levinson frankly concedes that his theory ‘‘does not explain the sense of
‘artwork’”;44 that is, he offers only a theory of identiﬁcation procedures,
not a theory of the value and signiﬁcance of works of art in general, for
works of art have many, incommensurable values, signiﬁcances, and his-
torical modes of appearance. ‘‘There are,” he rightly observes, ‘‘no clear
limits to the sorts of things people may seriously intend us to regard-as-
a-work-of-art.”45 This is not a purely sociological or ‘‘external” theory of
art, since success and failure in presentation for such regarding are possi-
ble, but contrary to centrally functional theories of art there is no single
account on offer of what all works of art should or must do, of what
values or signiﬁcances they should or must carry. Historically, art is too
variable for that. Despite the airs of circularity and disappointment that
they carry, it is impossible not to feel the force of such stances. Art is for
us an evolving and unsettled matter.
Theories of art that focus preeminently on the task of elucidation
include such widely differing theories as Aristotle’s theory of artistic
representation, Kant’s theory of artistic value, and R. G. Collingwood’s
theory of expression. These theories all propose to tell us in some detail
how and why art does and should matter for us. They undertake to spec-
ify a function for art in solving a fundamental human problem or in
43 Monroe C. Beardsley, Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism, 2nd edn
(Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1981), p. xxii.
44 Levinson, ‘‘Deﬁning Art Historically,” p. 236. 45 ibid., p. 239.
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answering to a fundamental human interest. In thus focusing primarily
on human problems and interests, described in terms that are not imme-
diately physical, such theories tend at bottom to have more rationalist and
functionalist epistemological and metaphysical commitments. For each of
them, making and attending to art are centrally important to getting on
well with human life: for example, to knowing what human life is like
and to training the passions, to achieving a kind of felt harmony with
one’s natural and cultural worlds, and to overcoming repressiveness and
rigidity of mind and action.
These different but more value- and function-oriented theories of art
likewise have considerable merits. They offer articulate accounts of how
and why art matters for us. Thus they immediately suggest why we do
and should have formal practices of training in the arts and their criti-
cism. They offer prospects of engaging in the practices of art and criticism
with more alert critical awareness of what these enterprises are all about.
Yet they too run considerable risks. They tend toward somewhat specula-
tive, not clearly empirically veriﬁable, accounts of human interests. Not
everyone will immediately feel the presence and force of the supposedly
‘‘deep” human problems that art is taken to address. When they attend to
individual works of art at all, they tend to focus on a narrower range of
centrally exemplary cases, ignoring the great variety of things that have
been historically regarded as art. Hence in both their accounts of art’s
functions and in the identiﬁcations that ﬂow from them, they tend to-
ward one-sidedness and tendentiousness. Critical power is purchased at
the cost of ﬂexibility.
Kant and Collingwood, in particular, each have some awareness of
this problem. Hence they seek to make their functional deﬁnitions of
art abstract enough to accommodate signiﬁcant differences in successful
works, and they each resist limiting success in artistic making to any
ﬁxed media of art. As their deﬁnitions become more abstract and ﬂexible,
however, they tend sometimes to lose the very critical and elucidatory
content that they were intended to provide. Moreover, the application of
such deﬁnitions seems to require the very kind of creative, perceptive
critical work that is carried out by the kinds of experts, representatives
of institutions, and historical varieties of audiences that are highlighted
in centrally identiﬁcatory theories of art. Yet despite their risks of one-
sidedness and tendentiousness, it is impossible too not to feel the force
of such stances. Art, and especially art as it is instanced in some central
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cases, does seem centrally to matter for us, in ways about which we might
hope to become more articulate.
The tension between accounts of art that focus on identiﬁcation of
the varieties of art and those that focus on the critical elucidation of
art’s functions and values is a real one. It reﬂects the deeper tension in
human life generally, and especially in modernity, between the idea that
humanity has a function,46 or at least a set of human interests to be
fully realized in a ‘‘free” human cultural life that is richer and more self-
conscious than are the lives of other animals, and the idea that human
beings are nothing more than elements of a meaningless, functionless
physical nature, wherein accommodation, coping, and compromise are the
best outcomes for which they can hope. As Dewey penetratingly remarks,
The opposition that now exists between the spiritual and ideal elements
of our historic heritage [stemming from Greek teleology and medieval
Christian theology] and the structure of physical nature that is disclosed
by [modern, physical] science, is the ultimate source of the dualisms
formulated by philosophy since Descartes and Locke. These formulations
in turn reﬂect a conﬂict that is everywhere active in modern civilization.
From one point of view the problem of recovering an organic place for
art in civilization is like the problem of reorganizing our heritage from
the past and the insights of present knowledge into a coherent and
integrated imaginative union.47
Both art and the theory of art are everywhere contested within this
pervasive opposition and conﬂict. What counts as artistic success is un-
clear. Human interests in general are not coherently and transparently
realized in social life. New media can be explored in the attempt to fulﬁll
the functions of art, and the functions of art can themselves be reartic-
ulated, in the effort to bring them into clearer alignment and afﬁliation
with the pursuit of other interests. Hence the philosophy of art -- involving
both its identiﬁcation and the elucidation of art’s function and value -- is
46 The classical locus for the ineliminability of the idea that human consciousness,
including openness to the force of reasons, has the function of determining human
life and culture as a free product in accordance with reason is Kant’s discussion of the
fact of reason in the Critique of Practical Reason. For a rehearsal of Kant’s development
of this idea, see Richard Eldridge, The Persistence of Romanticism: Essays in Philosophy and
Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 13--19.
47 Dewey, Art as Experience, p. 338.
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likewise contested and unclear. While it is logically possible to have both
agreement in the application of the term art but disagreement about the
functions of art and agreement about functions but disagreement about
application, in fact disagreements about both application (identiﬁcation)
and functions (meaning) are pervasive, and this is because of the back-
ground in (modern) social life of pervasive unclarity about and contesta-
tion of common human functions, problems, and interests in general.
What may we hope for from the philosophy of art?
This social situation of art and of the theory of art explains both the
rise, fall, and yet continuing appeal of so-called antiessentialism about
art and the current largely antagonistic relations between the normative
philosophy of art and ‘‘advanced” (poststructuralist and materialist) criti-
cal theory and practice. Beginning in the late 1950s, inspired by a certain
reading (arguably a misreading) of Wittgenstein,48 Morris Weitz49 and
W. E. Kennick,50 among others, argued that art has no essence, fulﬁlls no
single function, solves no single common problem. Yet we know perfectly
well, they further claimed, which individual works count as art. Art and
criticism have neither need of nor use for theory. (‘‘Aesthetics is for the
artist as ornithology is for the birds.”) Maurice Mandelbaum replied that
it might be possible to formulate an abstract, relational, functional gener-
alization about the nature and value of art,51 and Guy Sircello added that
in proposing various deﬁning functions for art theorists were -- reasonably
but contestably -- expressing their particular senses of central human prob-
lems to which art might answer. Here the stance of Weitz and Kennick
embodies a certain conservatism about high culture coupled with respect
48 For a general survey of so-called Wittgensteinian antiessentialism, see Richard
Eldridge, ‘‘Problems and Prospects of Wittgensteinian Aesthetics,” Journal of Aesthetics
and Art Criticism 45, 3 (spring 1987), pp. 251--61.
49 See Morris Weitz, ‘‘The Role of Theory in Aesthetics,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art
Criticism 15 (1956); reprinted in Philosophy of Art, ed. Neill and Ridley, pp. 183--92.
50 See W. E. Kennick, ‘‘Does Traditional Aesthetics Rest on a Mistake?,” Mind 67, 267
(July 1958); reprinted in Aesthetics Today, ed. M. Philipson and P. J. Gudel (New York:
New American Library, 1980), pp. 459--76.
51 Maurice Mandelbaum, ‘‘Family Resemblances and Generalization Concerning the
Arts,” American Philosophical Quarterly 2, 3 (1965); reprinted in Philosophy of Art, ed. Neill
and Ridley, pp. 193--201.
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for art’s diversities and suspicion of the tendentiousness of theory, while
Mandelbaum and Sircello are attracted by functional explanations of art,
yet tentative about asserting any one explanation deﬁnitely. In retrospect,
we can now recognize this debate as a reﬂection of the social situation of
art, against the background of unclarity about and contestation of func-
tions in human life more generally.
Contemporary advanced ‘‘materialist” criticism of art and literature,
stemming from such late Marxist ﬁgures as Louis Althusser, Pierre
Macherey, Pierre Bourdieu, and Fredric Jameson, emphasizes that all so-
called works of art are produced by people with certain material, social
backgrounds (certain places in a network of economic and cultural capital)
and for audiences with certain material, social backgrounds and conse-
quent expectations about art.52 Since the material social world is always
saturated with multiple inequalities in economic and cultural capital
(worker vs. owner; white collar vs. industrial worker; modern individualist
vs. traditionalist, etc.), no work of art can ‘‘succeed” for everyone, and the
efforts of traditional art theory to specify a central function for art in
general for people in general are misbegotten. The best we can aspire to is
‘‘critical” self-consciousness about who produces what for whom. At some
level of description, such accounts are surely illuminating. Against this
kind of cultural materialist theory and criticism, more traditional, nor-
mative theorists object that there are unpredictable works that transcend
standard class afﬁliations, transﬁguring the experience and perception of
signiﬁcantly diverse audiences. In Tom Huhn’s apt phrase, there is some-
times an ‘‘opacity of success”53 in the arts -- an unpredictable success in re-
alizing artistic value in a way that holds diverse attentions -- that cultural
materialist theorists such as Bourdieu sometimes neglect or underarticu-
late. Why should we not theorize about that (including theorizing about
cultural conditions under which various achievements of this kind are
managed)? Here, too, we can recognize in this debate the social situation
of art and its theory. Art seems both to have a function, sometimes exem-
plarily realized, in relation to deep human problems and interests, and it
52 For a general survey of this kind of late or post-Marxist work, see Richard Eldridge,
‘‘Althusser and Ideological Criticism of the Arts,” in Explanation and Value in the Arts,
ed. Ivan Gaskell and Salim Kemal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp.
190--214; reprinted in Eldridge, Persistence of Romanticism, pp. 165--88.
53 Tom Huhn, book review, ‘‘The Field of Cultural Production: Essays on Art and Literature
by Pierre Bourdieu,” Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 54, 1 (winter 1996), p. 88B.
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seems also in every particular case to be by and for particular makers and
audiences, responding to problems and pressures that are not universal.
In this situation, reasonable argument about both the elucidatory def-
inition of art and the identiﬁcation of particular works remains possible.
Yet argument here must remain motivated not by any methodological
assurance of conclusiveness, but rather by the hope of agreement, to be
achieved in and through arriving at a more transparent, shared culture,
in which it is clearer than it is now which practices fulﬁll which func-
tions and serve which reasonable interests. The hope of agreement is here
supported by partial successes in the identiﬁcation of particular works,
in critical commentary on them, and in the elucidation of the nature of
art. With regard to some particular works, there are deep, unpredictable
and yet to some extent articulable resonances of response among widely
varying audiences, and criticism and theory have managed in many cases
to arrive at compelling articulations of artistic achievements, in particular
and in general, even where disagreements also remain. A standing human
interest in art, as that interest has been realized in some exemplary cases,
has been given some articulate shape by criticism in conjunction with the
theory of art.
Roger Scruton has suggested that our response to art involves the en-
gagement of what he calls our sense of the appropriate. This sense can
come into play throughout human life: in social relations, in games, in
business, in sports, and in jokes, among many other places, as we are
struck by the internal coherence of a performance and its aptness to an
occasion. Scruton suggests that it is especially freely and powerfully en-
gaged by art. ‘‘Our sense of the appropriate, once aroused, entirely pen-
etrates our response to art, dominating not only our awareness of form,
diction, structure, and harmony, but also our interest in action, character,
and feeling.”54
The most compelling and signiﬁcant developed philosophies of art --
the theories of imitation and representation, of form and artistic beauty,
and of expression -- that are the subjects of the next three chapters -- can
best be understood as focusing on various aspects of the artistic achieve-
ment of appropriateness. Representation, form, and expression are all, one
might say, interrelated aspects of artistic achievement. (Note that Scruton
claims that the sense of the appropriate includes awareness all at once of
54 Roger Scruton, Art and Imagination (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982), p. 248.
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what is represented [action and character], of form, and of what is
expressed [feeling].) The major theorists of representation, form, and
expression -- Aristotle, Kant, and Collingwood, and their contemporary
inheritors and revisers, such as Walton, Beardsley, and Goodman -- each
highlight for us a particular dimension of the artistic engagement of our
sense of appropriateness, and, as we shall see, in doing so they further
begin to acknowledge the interrelations of these dimensions of artistic
success. Without representation and expression, in some sense, there is
no artistic form, but only decoration; without artistic form, there is no
artistic representation or artistic expression, but only declamation and
psychic discharge. By following closely and critically major theories of
artistic representation, artistic form, and artistic expression, and then by
considering artistic originality, critical understanding, evaluation, emo-
tional response, art and morality, and art and society in the light of these
theories, we may hope to make some progress in becoming more artic-
ulate about the nature of art and its distinctive roles in human life. To
recall Murdoch’s picture of metaphysics, we might hope from within the
morass of existence in which we ﬁnd ourselves immersed to set up a
picture of the nature and function of art as a kind of appeal -- to ourselves
above all, and without any assured termination -- to see if we can ﬁnd just
this in our deepest experiences of art and of ourselves.
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